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ABSTRACT: This paper reports the preliminary results of a content analysis of the use and functions of
reasonableness in the New York Times editorial page from 1860-2004. We begin by setting out several
reasons why we should devote our critical attention to the concept of reasonableness. We then justify our
choice of the New York Times editorial page and describe our sample and analytic method. The body of the
paper reports three results. First, the primary meanings of the concept are detailed. These include prudence,
rationality, fairness, and appropriateness. Second, a distinction between an epistemic and a non-epistemic
function of the concept was found in both the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data. Moreover,
we found that the vast majority of the editorials employ the non-epistemic function--a fact that we argue
has significant consequences for argumentation theory. Finally, we found that the topoi of reasonableness
primarily concern the legitimacy of applications of social and political power. We conclude that to
explicate the meanings and functions of reasonableness is to explicate the rhetoric of power in liberal
democracies.
KEY WORDS: reasonable, unreasonable, reasonableness, unreasonableness, prudence, rationality, fairness,
appropriateness, New York Times, power

There are several reasons to devote our critical attention to understanding the nature and
functions of reasonableness. Quite simply, reasonableness is the most important concept
in argumentation studies. A philosophical account of reasonableness underwrites the
theoretical, empirical, and practical endeavors of all argumentation research (van
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). Any comprehensive research program in
argumentation—a program that can claim both empirical adequacy and critical insight—
is underwritten by a philosophical ideal of reasonableness that establishes the standards
of warranted assent, provides the assumptive framework for a normative model of
argumentative discourse and, thereby, provides the criteria for describing and evaluating
naturally occurring argumentative practices.
Moreover, reasonableness is not simply a part of the argumentation scholars’
critical apparatus; it serves several important functions in public deliberation.
Stakeholders use it as a resource to describe, critique and justify the norms regulating the
inclusion and exclusion of group perspectives, of modes of communication and of
knowledge claims in public deliberations because it functions as a standard by which the
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practices of public justification can be evaluated; and it in turn informs the design
processes for both training participants and facilitating public communication.
Finally, the ideal of reasonableness has also been undergoing a major revival in
political philosophy. At the forefront of this revival is the distinction between rationality
and reasonableness that forms the core of John Rawls’ (1996) re-visioning of democratic
theory. For Rawls, to be politically reasonable means that citizens are willing to
collaborate with others in proposing fair terms of social cooperation and have the
commitment to act on these terms, even if doing so means that they must accept less than
what was hoped for. As politically reasonable persons, they will think it unreasonable to
use political power to repress any conception of the good and the life-plans it generates
that differs from their own, unless it can be demonstrated that these plans entail the
degradation of others. In that case they will use political power to contain only those
aspects of the others’ actions that result in degradation, making no provisions that that
person must convert to a belief system they deem rational to be included as full and equal
members of the political community. Rawls’ insistence on the distinction between the
rational and reasonable—a distinction which ultimately holds that political actors
searching for just accommodations in a radically plural society practice a form of
epistemic abstinence—has ignited a major theoretical controversy in democratic theory.
The possibilities for collaboration between argumentation scholarship and
democratic theory, on this issue, are striking. On its face, it seems that argumentation
theory could provide deliberative democrats with a conception of reasonableness that
could underwrite a model of political dialogue capable of resolving disputes between
those persons who radically differ in social and political views. And political philosophy
could provide argumentation theorists with an account of the conditions of justice within
deeply pluralistic societies necessary to underwrite the procedural rules that would make
such a model of dialogue successful. However, this is a much more difficult task than it
appears. First, the extant accounts of reasonableness within argumentation theory are still
too closely tied to models of epistemic rationality to serve as the basis for the overlapping
consensus on political values that Rawls envisions as the basis for democratic liberalism.
And, secondly, Rawls’ formulation remains too monological to serve as the basis for a
robust model of public deliberation, a model that would not simply label all those who
disagreed with extant norms as unreasonable (Hicks, 2002). The challenge, then, is to
refashion argumentation theorists’ account of the reasonable in terms that are more
conducive to the epistemic pluralism that marks our political existence and to refashion
Rawls’ and other deliberative democrats’ conception of reasonableness in more dialogic
and transformative terms.
We contend that the best means for pursuing this transformational project is to
look to actual instances of argumentative practice as the grounds for respecifying what
constitutes political reasonableness. To date, we have found no systematic treatment of
political reasonableness grounded in the analysis of argumentative discourse. Perhaps this
is because what counts as reasonable is open to debate. What constitutes reasonableness
is itself an essentially political question and therefore intrinsically indeterminate.
Interlocutors use the ideal normatively and reflexively to manage the trajectory of their
critical discussions. By employing reasonableness as a normative meta-discourse for
talking about what they and their fellow interlocutors do, arguers categorize and
characterize, they impose an interpretative grid on argumentative conduct and its agents.
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Hence to gain a firm grasp on how the concept is used generally one would have to
supplement theoretical reflection and case study with a method that examines hundreds, if
not thousands, invocations of the concept in moments of deliberative rhetoric.
The editorial page of the New York Times is an ideal candidate for such an
endeavor. It is national in scope. It is deliberative in character, even when discussing
legal issues or political leadership. It is inherently argumentative. And, most importantly,
it purports both to represent and to cultivate a public voice. In one of the few instances
where the Times editorial staff have used the page to publicly reflect on its rhetorical
character (occasioned by the retirement of John B. Oakes, who presided over the editorial
page from 1956-1977), they noted that ‘from out front, we know, an editorial page
appears to be a chorus without a face, a booming but disembodied voice, a We that
represents no discernable I. We work hard at that illusion. When borne aloft by a great
news machine, an editorial page speaks louder than any individual could, or should; that
is why we speak anonymously.’ Perfectly illustrating the rhetorical strategies of
abstraction and negativity that Michael Warner has shown to be so effective in
formulating a public, the Times staff go on to define the ‘editorial We’ as the ‘community
of the reasonable and responsible’ a universal audience, or if you prefer a Bakhtinian
super-addressee, which via a process of rhetorical transfiguration embodies
reasonableness.
The Times editorial page invoked the concept of reasonableness (operationalized
by the use of the terms reasonable, unreasonable, reasonableness, and
unreasonableness) in 22,314 editorials between January 1860 and December 2004 (the
newspaper started publishing in 1851, but the terms do not appear in the database until
1860). We analyzed a sample of 1,865 editorials to discover the various meanings
associated with the concept. A random sampling procedure that ensured an even time
series was used. Four editorials from each year in three-month intervals were taken,
shifting the four months we used each year. This ensured a sample from each month. The
result was a sample of 576 editorials using the word reasonable and 572 using the word
unreasonable. Given the smaller amount of total usage, all 602 editorials using the term
reasonableness and all 115 editorials using the term unreasonableness were included in
the sample.
We analyzed approximately 400 editorials over a six-month period as a team to
develop the coding scheme. For the initial phase of the study we concentrated our efforts
on cataloging the meanings of the concept. All coding was performed by two members of
the team. Reliability was assessed by recoding of a random sub-sample, yielding Kappa
scores of 1.00 for the terms unreasonable, reasonableness and unreasonableness and
.873 for the term reasonable; for a total combined Kappa of .892. Upon achieving
reliability, the complete sample was distributed between the two coders.
There are four basic meanings of reasonableness as used in the Times editorial
page. These are prudent, rational, fair, and appropriate. Let’s examine each one in turn.
1. Prudence. Prudence refers to the ability to judge in a contextually sensitive
manner. At its core, prudence is a character trait that materializes in and through a
person’s decision-making abilities; a person who uses common sense and good judgment
to arrive at contextually sensitive decisions is said to be reasonable. For instance an
October 1, 1909 editorial entitled ‘Judge Gaynor and Tammany: two mayoral candidates’
contrasts Judge Gaynor who is described as ‘ill-balanced in mind’ and ‘disregardful of
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the consequences of his acts or words,’ and Mr. Bannard who ‘is the very embodiment of
those qualities of reasonableness, balance, business experience, and wise of
understanding of the true welfare of the city which in Judge Gaynor are so conspicuous in
their absence’. To understand the use of reasonable you need only contrast it with the
terms used to describe Judge Gaynor, ‘ill-balanced in mind’ and particularly ‘disregardful
of the consequences of his acts or words.’ Reasonableness in this sense contrasts with
poor judgment and a blatant disregard for context.
2. Rationality. In its most general sense, rationality referred to those judgments
based upon, or at least appearing to be based upon, a logical inference supported by
sound evidence. The most common usage in the editorials, however, was to describe a
person willing to give and listen to good reasons and who draws conclusions based on the
best available evidence. The unreasonable actor refuses to consider the good reasons
offered by others. Reasonableness as rationality is often used to describe the relationship
between one’s perception and the facts of the matter, or one’s emotional state and reality,
as well as the relationship between means and ends. For instance, in a December 5th 1982
editorial titled ‘Stimulate’ in which the Times argues that the Reagan administration
monetary policies were making the pain of the recession worse, it is suggested that fears
that easing credit would bring back inflation were not ‘reasonable’ once all the facts were
considered. ‘These are reasonable fears, but only in the abstract. The inflation risk would
not be worth taking if unemployment were say, 7.8 percent and factories were operating
at 75 percent of capacity. But unemployment is now 10.8 percent and factories are
operating at an anemic 68 percent.’ Or, for example, in an August 1, 1981 editorial titled
‘The Constitution on Guns’ in which the Times argues that the right to carry a firearm
should be restricted to those cases where it can be shown that the possession of a firearm
bears some ‘reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated
militia.’
3. Fairness. Fairness is used to describe persons and proposals. A fair proposal
(or a demand, a request and many other possible variants) is one that is equitable or just
for all parties involved. Again, perhaps the most common usage of fairness is to refer to a
person willing to propose or abide by fair terms of cooperation. Unfairness, or in our case
unreasonableness, refers to inequitable proposals or people who refuse to propose or
abide by fair terms of cooperation. Fairness is by far the most common meaning of
reasonableness, prevalent in discussions of labor, anti-trust, tariffs and diplomacy, in
particular US/Soviet cold war diplomacy. The actors in the Cold War drama, particularly
Soviet and U.S. politicians, were often characterized as being either reasonable or
unreasonable, as were their policies and proposals. For instance, in a May 10th 1952
editorial on the upcoming Geneva summit: ‘The communists think that their best tactic at
Geneva would be to show enough reasonableness to keep the trend toward the summit
strong, but enough firmness of basic position to demonstrate that only the men of the
summit can come to any meaningful agreement.’ Reasonableness is also used ironically
to cast doubt on Soviet motives. For instance, in an April 4th 1954 editorial titled ‘Behind
New Soviet Peace Drive: Three Aims:’ ‘The present soviet strategy appears to have two
quite different faces. One is represented by the seemingly sweet reasonableness of the
latest Soviet note suggesting, in effect, that Russia, the United States and all European
nations join together in one happy family, freed from the threat of war by the collective
security of East and West. Soviet propaganda on expanded East-West trade is in the same
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vein.’ In the above examples reasonableness is used to acknowledge a desire to cooperate
and a sense of justice, both in action and in result.
4. Appropriateness. Appropriateness is multi-faceted, meaning both ‘fitting to
social norms,’ and ‘within or exceeding proper limits; proportional.’ The issue of social
norms refers specifically to people’s modes of presentation and how those modes
measure up to societal expectations. Issues such as presentation of self in public, style,
and conforming to gender or race norms fit under this meaning category, though to our
surprise this is one of the least frequent uses of the term in our database. Proportionality,
however, after fairness, is the most common usage, often referring to how rates or prices
measure up in comparison to what others charge for the same service, and whether that
rate is consistent with the general social expectation of what such a service should cost.
Of particular importance in the late 19th and early 20th century were issues pertaining to
the railways. Take for instance a July 7th 1874 editorial titled ‘An Important Decision,’
which argued against the Wisconsin Railroad Law, which had recently reduced fares by
25%. The Wisconsin legislature, one of the most left-leaning, populist legislatures of that
time, had taken on the issue of fares, setting what constituted a ‘reasonable’ rate by
stipulating what they thought were ‘reasonable’ profits. This is a clear use of
reasonableness as fairness. The railroad corporations, on the other hand, argued that a
jury not the legislature should determine what constituted a reasonable rate. The railways
hoped that juries would not use such a ‘political’ standard of ‘reasonableness,’ but would
instead favor the stockholders (juries in this case being much more likely to be populated
by shareholders than the poor) and would allow the railroad to determine what constituted
a ‘reasonable’ rate, based on what the public would pay and what profits it could accrue.
Or as the editorial page put it: ‘What is a reasonable rate is a problem constantly
changing, and one which can not be determined with any hard and fast rule. The question
whether in any case rates are unreasonable must, the company maintains, be tried like any
other controversy, before a court and jury, with liberty for both parties to be heard.’ The
key similarity between reasonableness as socially appropriate and reasonableness as cost
proportionate is that both meanings look to how an act or a rate measure up in the eyes of
the party being affected by a particular transaction (with who that is always being open to
debate, as we see in this example). If a charge is deemed to violate a societal expectation,
or the charge is not deemed proportionate to the service provided, it is labeled
unreasonable.
The first two meaning categories, prudence and rationality, taken together
comprised what we understand as an epistemic conceptualization of reasonableness.
Epistemic reasonableness is defined as the sound use of reason, the use of commonly
accepted facts, and sensitivity to context as the basis of judgment. It also refers to the
psychological and ethical capacities necessary to use reason soundly. The test of such a
conception is whether or not it is ultimately grounded in some notion of truth or
truthfulness, even if that notion of truth is very liberally defined as social consensus,
coherence or fittingness rather than correspondence.
The two remaining meaning categories—fairness and appropriateness—depart
from the epistemic norm. What we call non-epistemic reasonableness is the judgment that
an application of power (which can be encapsulated in a statement, proposal or demand)
is just and/or fitting to the social norms of a particular community (social standards
themselves can be judged as unreasonable, as unfair). This also includes the willingness
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to propose and abide by fair, just and appropriate terms of social cooperation. Thus, it
may be a description of an act or person. The test of such a conception is whether or not it
is ultimately grounded in a notion of justice. That is, even if the statement or proposal
was backed by good reason, evidence or a responsiveness to the situation, that fact would
not be sufficient to show that it was fair, just or appropriate. This extra criterion is the
non-epistemic content of reasonableness.
Our analysis has just begun, with most of our time thus far being spent on
generating these meaning categories. However, we would like to conclude with two
interesting findings that have emerged from the quantitative analysis of the sample.
Assuming we have done a ‘reasonable’ job of differentiating these usages, we
would benefit from an empirical test of how these usages relate to each other. That is, are
some usages more likely to be used to together or co-vary with each other or are all these
independent of each other in use? A principal component analysis was performed on the
correlations between the frequencies of the usages across the 144 years. That is, the
extent to which the uses co-varied with each other was examined by correlating the
frequencies of the four usages. For example, to what extent is prudence used more in
years that fairness is also used more. The resulting correlation matrix tells us the extent
to which usage co-varies with every other usage.
The result of a principal component analysis with varimax rotations was a threefactor solution. That solution is provided in the table below.
Table One: Factor Loadings after Varimax Rotation
Variables
Factor1
Factor2
X1 (prudence)
-0.069912
0.982552
X2 (rationality)
-0.101732
0.041543
X3 (fairness)
-0.846087
-0.076802
X4 (app.)
-0.741817
0.202569

Factor3
-0.040631
-0.991845
-0.020567
-0.130528

The solution is very clear. Two of the four usages form their own factor and are
independent of each other. Factor two is defined almost exclusively by prudence. And
factor three is defined almost exclusively by rationality. These two factors, or usages,
vary independently of each other. The remaining two usages, fairness and
appropriateness, together define factor one. The fact that they are loaded so strongly on
the same factor and that the other two variables, prudence and rationality, are loaded
weakly on that factor suggests that these two usages may be very similar to each other.
Further, these results suggest that a revision of the analytic distinctions set out above may
be appropriate. That is, we may want to consider fairness and appropriateness as a single
meaning category. The results of this factor analysis, if taken seriously, may be
considered in a very positive light. One of the standards by which theory is often judged
is parsimony: the ability of a theory to explain or predict with fewer, rather than more,
theoretical units. In this case we may say that we can understand the meaning of
reasonableness in public deliberations by distinguishing three, rather than four, uses of
the term.
The vast majority of usage is comprised of factor one, the non-epistemic
categories fairness and appropriateness. In fact the epistemic categories, rationality and
prudence, factors two and three, comprise only 30% of the total population, with

196

POLITICAL REASONABLENESS

prudence making up 6% and rationality making up 24% of the total uses of the term.
Factor one, on the other hand, makes up 70% of the total population, with appropriateness
accounting for 24% and fairness accounting for 46% of the population.
What is most striking about this distribution is its dissonance with contemporary
argumentation theory. Argumentation theorists currently understand reasonableness in
epistemic terms. This is true for each of the major schools of argumentation theory.
Informal logicians understand reasonableness as an objective standard of argument
evaluation, one comprised of the rules of rational inference. Reasonableness is a quality
ascribed to epistemically serious arguments or rationally motivated persons. An argument
is reasonable if substantive (objective, fair, and non-question-begging) criteria and
standards are applied appropriately. An argument is reasonable, then, inasmuch as it is
rational, albeit in a material rather than a purely formal sense. A reasonable person
properly assesses reasons and desires to govern her or his judgment and conduct in line
with rational principles. Harvey Siegel (1988) posits this desire or ‘critical spirit’ as the
defining disposition of a reasonable person. A reasonable person has more than highly
developed critical thinking skills: she or he has a certain sort of character, ‘a character
which is inclined to seek, and to base judgment and action upon, reason; which rejects
partiality and arbitrariness; which is committed to the objective evaluation of relevant
evidence, and which values such aspects of critical thinking as intellectual honesty,
justice to evidence, sympathetic and impartial considerations of interests, objectivity and
impartiality’ (p. 34). Hence, informal logicians would focus almost exclusively on factor
three. Pragma-dialecticians understand reasonableness in terms of the disposition of the
arguer, as the willingness to conform to the rules of critical-rational discussion, most
importantly to avoid using fallacious reasoning. Procedural theories locate reasonableness
in the goal-oriented standards regulating the conduct of argumentative discussions and
the methods for evaluating inferential form (van Eemeren et al., 1993). A procedural
design and its attendant code of conduct defines the parameters of reasonableness. Thus,
‘an ideal model aims at providing an adequate grasp of argumentative discourse by
specifying which modes of arguing are acceptable to a rational judge in view of a certain
philosophical conception of reasonableness’ (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 7).
If we do not assume the presence of umpires to regulate participants’ argumentative
moves, then we must presume that interlocutors will govern their own conduct.
Participants must become the rational judges who adjudicate meta-level disputes arising
in argumentative discussions; they must not simply know the rules of critical discussion
but must also have the ability and desire to apply these rules to their own conduct. In
other words, they must be reasonable persons. The epistemic ideal of reasonableness as
rational disposition, therefore, is a constitutive prerequisite of the procedural ideal (van
Eemeren et al., 1993; Habermas, 1996). Hence, pragma-dialecticians too would be
concerned with factor three. And rhetoricians understand reasonableness as an embodied,
communicative rationality, a prudence cashed out in terms of a non-dogmatic, openmindedness. Rhetoricians define reasonableness as a respecification of rationality in less
formal and transcendental terms than allowed by the epistemic tradition. Reasonableness
is an inclusive, substantive, and multifaceted account of rationality that avoids the antimodern excesses, in particular relativism, of those who would reject reason outright.
‘This different way of thinking about rationality,’ Nicholas Burbules (1995) explains,
‘provides the guidance and structure needed for coherent thought in epistemic, practical,
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and moral matters without proclaiming the existence of transcendental and universal
standards that are problematic from a postmodern point of view’ (p. 84). As defined
within the rhetorical perspective, the reasonable, then, is the rational, albeit a socialized
or communicative rationality. Thus rhetoricians would focus on the qualities expressed in
factor two (a selection perhaps shaped by the practice of examining the arguments and
acts of particular speakers). While traces of a non-epistemic conceptualization can be
found in each of these perspectives, they each purchase critical objectivity by conflating
reasonableness and epistemic rationality. We can tentatively conclude, then, that
contemporary argumentation theory can only account for 30% of the ways in which
reasonableness is used in public argument. This inability to adequately account for the
most prevalent meanings of reasonableness may warrant a substantial re-specification of
our philosophical conception of reasonableness, and, given the centrality of the concept, a
re-specification of contemporary argumentation theory as a whole.
Second, the distribution of usage over time revealed an interesting pattern. 52% of
all uses of the concept appeared between 1870 and 1919. That is, out of the 144 years we
examined more than half of the total population occurred in a 49-year period. This sharp
spike in usage is intriguing. What was going on during those 49 years that made
reasonableness such an important concept? Even a cursory glance at the historical field
reveals a US marked by savage class conflict, extreme polarization of wealth, and
widespread political violence. The US was undergoing a period of profound
transformation, not only in the physical landscape of the country but, more importantly,
through the invention of a distinctively modern, liberal governmentality. For instance, the
post-reconstruction era saw the advent of modern transportation. We read hundreds of
editorials about the regulation of the railways, the construction of subways systems and
problems of urban planning associated with increase automobile traffic. The time was
marked by the rise of the modern labor movement; hundreds of editorials from our
sample dealt with the power of unions, the ethics of strikes and the efficacy of boycotts.
Moreover, the rise of industrialism spawned a rise in monopolies and the contaminant
trust-busting policies that dominated the political debate of the era. The NYT editorial
page found itself debating the details of the Sherman Anti-trust Act and the so-called
‘rule of reason’ underwriting it. And the era was marked by the growth of US hegemony
and imperialism, by rancorous debates over trade and tariffs, and by the aftermath of the
Spanish-American war, the colonization of the Philippines, and WWI.
What strikes us about this pattern is that the topics debated during the progressive
era uniformly concerned the legitimate application of political and social power, whether
that be in the form of an unreasonable wage, a reasonable contract demand, an
unreasonable limit on competition, or the reasonableness of a treaty provision. In fact, we
found that term, across the entire 144 years, was invoked to endorse and critique the
application of power, to articulate communal standards of fairness, propriety and reason
by which to guide the application of power and to cope with its effects. Hence, to map the
meanings of reasonableness is to begin to explicate the rhetoric of power.
While this project is far from complete, it is becoming increasingly clear that the
contests over what is reasonable, how its meanings shift over time and situation, and its
continual power to signal the substance and limits of social being are a sign that it is a
unique philosophical concept; one capable of disclosing the contours of the political
imagination of the public as it struggles to articulate and embody its conception of justice.
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